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Abstract. Cooperators that refuse to participate in sanctioning defectors create
the second-order free-rider problem. Such cooperators will not be punished because
they contribute to the public good, but they also eschew the costs associated with
punishing defectors. Altruistic punishers — those that cooperate and punish — are
at a disadvantage, and it is puzzling how such behaviour has evolved. We show
that sharing the responsibility to sanction defectors rather than relying on certain
individuals to do so permanently can solve the problem of costly punishment. Inspired
by the fact that humans have strong but also emotional tendencies for fair play, we
consider probabilistic sanctioning as the simplest way of distributing the duty. In well-
mixed populations the public goods game is transformed into a coordination game
with full cooperation and defection as the two stable equilibria, while in structured
populations pattern formation supports additional counterintuitive solutions that are
reminiscent of Parrondo’s paradox.
PACS numbers: 87.23.Ge, 89.75.Fb, 89.65.-s
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1. Introduction
Widespread cooperation among unrelated individuals distinguishes humans markedly
from other species [1, 2]. Although common marmosets and chimpanzees show similar
preferences towards altruism and reward division [3, 4, 5], suggesting a long evolutionary
history to the human sense of fairness [6], no other living organism is as apt in taking
full advantage of collaborative eﬀorts as humans. Indeed, we champion altruism and
fairness [7, 8], and we are willing to punish those who strive for excess benefits by
unfair means [9]. Besides individual eﬀorts aimed at punishing wrongdoers [10], our
societies are home to a plethora of sanctioning institutions [11], which are set up to
fine everything from overfishing to tax evasion. Recent experiments in fact suggest that
humans prefer pool punishment over peer punishment for maintaining the commons
[12]. But since sanctioning entails paying a cost for the free-riders to incur a cost, the
evolution of punishment, and perhaps even more so the evolution of institutionalised
punishment [13], is puzzling.
Seminal experiments by Fehr and Ga¨chter [14, 15] revealed that alone the loom of
sanctioning has an immediate positive eﬀect on the average contribution of players in
the public goods game [16, 17]. But it was only when the game was repeated many
times over that the full positive impact of punishment revealed itself. In the absence of
punishment contributions quickly decreased to marginal levels, while with punishment
they rose to almost all players had to oﬀer. And this outcome prevailed even if the players
knew they will never meet again in subsequent rounds of the game. The essence of the
puzzle, however, lays somewhat hidden in the fact that in the rounds with punishment,
the average income was usually below that without punishment. This is due to the fact
that punishment is costly [18]. Although the hope is that once cooperation is established
it can be sustained with significantly smaller eﬀorts, the question that needs answering
is why should a self-interested individual contribute to costly punishment in the first
place? Like forests, oil fields and grazing lands, the sanctioning apparatus is a public
good too, and it is therefore just as prone to exploitation and free-riding. But since an
individual may cooperate but not punish, the problem has come to be known as the
second-order free-rider problem [19].
Reputation has long been considered a key factor in models of cooperation [20, 21],
and it was suggested that individuals’ concern for their reputation may be a solution to
the second-order free-rider problem too [22]. Group selection has also been shown to play
an important role in the evolution of cooperative behaviour and altruistic punishment
[23], and volunteering [24], coordinated eﬀorts between the punishers [25, 26], and the
consideration of spatially structured populations [27], have all been shown to stabilize
punishment as well. These models assume, however, that once an individual acquires the
propensity to punish, it will do so permanently until a strategy change, for example when
imitating more successful strategies. Punishment is thus considered as a deterministic
act that is executed whenever needed. Yet human experiments reject such a hypothesis,
indicating instead that emotions are very much an integral part of sanctioning. Xiao
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and Houser conclude that constraints on emotion expression can increase the use of
costly punishment, and that punishment itself may be used to express negative emotions
[28]. Moreover, Egas and Riedl [18] find that their results are consistent with the
interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response
and cognitive cost-impact analysis.
Inspired by the important role that emotions play, we consider a public goods game
where cooperators are able to switch between contributing to the common pool and
contributing to the common pool as well as punishing defectors in a probabilistic manner.
The random exploration of sanctioning mimics the stochastic eﬀect of emotions on when
and how humans choose to punish [28, 18], and it also agrees with the outcome of
recent experiments on human strategy updating, which have revealed that spontaneous
strategy changes corresponding to exploration behaviour are in fact much more frequent
than assumed thus far in theoretical models [29]. Although random explorations of
strategies have been considered before in the realm of the public goods game with
voluntary participation [30, 31], our formulation of the game focuses explicitly on the
problem of costly punishment. Namely, even if the second-order free-rider problem is
assumed away so that every cooperator accepts the additional costs, the limits of costly
punishment are still obvious — if the costs exceed the fines punishment is likely to fail.
Here we show that this problem can be solved too, and that, rather counter-intuitively
and unexpectedly, second-order free-riders are the key to the solution.
The public goods game is played in groups of size n. Each cooperator (C)
contributes an amount c to the common pool, while defectors (D) contribute nothing.
The sum of all contributions in the group is multiplied by the enhancement factor
r > 1 and then split evenly among all group members. Subsequently, a fraction p of
cooperators within the group is selected randomly and designated as punishers (P ). If
the group contains at least one punisher, each defector in the group is punished with
a fine α. Punishers, on the other hand, equally share the associated costs, each paying
(n − nC)α/nP , where nC and nP are the number of cooperators and punishers in the
group, respectively. In agreement with these rules and if c = 1, the final payoﬀ of a
cooperator who does not punish is ΠC = rnC/n−1, while punishing cooperators receive
ΠP = rnC/n− 1− (n− nC)α/nP . Moreover, if there are no punishers in the group the
payoﬀ of a defector is ΠD = rnC/n, while if nP > 0 the payoﬀ is ΠD = rnC/n− α. We
emphasize that the formulation of punishment in our model does not assume limitless
resources being at disposal to the punishers. The fines administered to defectors
are covered in full by the costs incurred to punishers. This ensures sustainability of
sanctioning [32], but it also imposes a heavy load on the punishers. In the worst case
scenario, when a single punisher is surrounded by n−1 defectors, the cost of punishment
it has to bear is (n − 1) times the fine α imposed on each individual defector. The
execution of punishment is therefore very costly, which was traditionally considered a
prohibitive factor for the success of sanctioning.
We study the described public goods game by means of the replicator equation in
well-mixed populations, as well as by means of Monte Carlo simulations in structured
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Figure 1. Probabilistic sanctioning in well-mixed populations transforms the public
goods game into a coordination game with full cooperation and full defection as the two
stable equilibria. Depicted is the gradient of selection in dependence on the fraction
of cooperators. Stable steady states f = 0 and f = 1 are depicted with solid circles,
while the unstable steady state is depicted with an open circle. Arrows indicate the
expected direction of evolution. Cooperation is favoured over defection if the arrow
points to the right. Panel (a) shows results for p = 0.5 and different values of α, while
panel (b) show results for α = 0.5 and different values of p. Other parameter values
are r = 3.9 and n = 5.
populations. For details of the analysis we refer to the Methods section, while here we
proceed with the presentation of the main results. As we will show, the consideration
of probabilistic sanctioning alone suﬃces to solve the problem of costly punishment. To
punish defectors becomes an eﬀective means to promote public cooperation even if the
costs are much higher than the fines, as long as second-order free-riders play an active
role in the evolutionary process. More generally, our results suggest that sharing the
costs of any costly altruistic act may render it evolutionary stable despite peer pressure
from individually more profitable strategies.
2. Results
2.1. Well-mixed populations
The replicator equation [see Eq. (1) in Methods] defines the gradient of selection df/dt,
which determines the evolution of cooperative behaviour as illustrated in Fig. 1. Here
f is the fraction of all the cooperators in the population. If the fine α [see panel
(a)] or the probability to punish p [see panel (b)] is small, the gradient of selection
is always negative. Cooperators therefore die out regardless of the initial conditions.
For suﬃciently large values of α and p a new unstable steady state emerges within the
f ∈ (0.1) interval, which divides the system and gives rise to two basins of attraction.
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Depending on the initial conditions, the system will evolve either towards full defection
or towards full cooperation. Both f = 0 and f = 1 are stable steady states, indicating
that the probabilistic sanctioning transforms the public goods game into a coordination
game. The problem of costly punishment is thus solved, if only the initial fraction of
cooperators in the population is suﬃciently large, and if the probability to punish p and
the administered fine α are not too small. Moreover, the larger the value of α and p,
the larger the basin of attraction of the f = 1 steady state. However, the f = 0 steady
state always has a larger basin of attraction than the f = 1 steady state, because even
if the initial fraction of cooperators in the population is 0.5 the gradient of selection is
always negative for r < n.
We have also studied the replicator equation analytically in the limit of large α
and p values. The treatment is presented in the Methods section, and the outcome is
consistent with the results presented in Fig. 1, which are thus always valid for well-mixed
populations.
2.2. Structured populations
Unlike well-mixed populations, structured populations take into account the fact that
the interactions among players are typically not random but rather that they are limited
to a set of other players in the population, and as such are best described by a network.
We therefore study the evolution of cooperation on a square lattice, which is the simplest
of networks to fulfil this condition. We employ Monte Carlo simulations, as described
in the Methods section.
Colour maps presented in Fig. 2 depict the stationary fraction of cooperators
in dependence on the punishment fine α and the probability to punish p for three
intermediate values of the multiplication factor r. Going from panel (a) to panel (c),
we see that cooperative behaviour becomes more and more common, which is expected
given that the benefits of collaborative eﬀorts increase through larger values of r. The
impact of α and p is more subtle. As the values of the two parameters increase along
the diagonal in the α − p plane, the fraction of cooperators first increases, reaches a
maximum, but then again decreases. Increasing either of the two parameters while
the other is kept constant returns the same observation. Both α and p thus have a
non-monotonous impact on the cooperation level. At smaller values of r [see panel (a)]
this distinctive feature is more pronounced, but it remains present at higher values of
r as well [see panel (b) and (c)]. Probabilistic sanctioning thus promotes cooperative
behaviour on structured populations, yet it requires carefully measured eﬀorts both in
terms of severity and frequency of punishment. Compared to well-mixed populations,
this is a more complex evolutionary outcome that is due to the interplay of spatial
reciprocity and punishment.
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Figure 2. Probabilistic sanctioning in structured populations promotes the evolution
of public cooperation, yet the optimal outcome requires carefully adjusted severity
and frequency of punishment. Colour maps encode the fraction of cooperators in
dependence on the punishment ﬁne α and the probability to punish p, as obtained for
multiplication factors r = 3.6 (a), r = 3.9 (b), and r = 4.2 (c).
2.3. Spatial patterns of cooperation
An understanding of the results presented in Fig. 2 can be obtained with the study of
spatial patterns that emerge under the influence of probabilistic sanctioning. In Fig. 3,
we first present characteristic snapshots of the square lattice for three diﬀerent values
of p. When plotting the spatial distributions of strategies, it is helpful to use diﬀerent
colours to distinguish cooperators based on their propensity to punish. Cooperators
that are randomly selected as punishers in at least three of the five groups in which they
are involved are depicted green, while other cooperators are depicted blue. Defectors
are depicted red. If punishment is not an option (p = 0), cooperators have to rely
solely on spatial reciprocity to survive in the presence of defectors. As panels (a) to
(d) illustrate, cooperators form small yet compact clusters that protect them from the
invasions of defectors. This is the hallmark of network reciprocity, discovered first
by Nowak and May [33]. It is important to note that in the absence of punishment
the interfaces that separate cooperators and defectors are not smooth. This creates
ample opportunities for defectors to invade successfully, but it also quickly leaves them
surrounded by players of the same kind. Since locally there is nobody left to exploit the
invasion is stopped, but it also creates new irregularities along the interface which will
invite further invasions in the future. The dynamical equilibrium of these elementary
processes yields a stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors. At the other extreme,
if all cooperators are always ready to punish (p = 1), the morphology of the spatial
patterns is slightly diﬀerent. As panels (j) and (k) illustrate, due to the consistent
application of punishment the interfaces are somewhat smoother. Individual defectors
deep in the bulk of punishers struggle to invade because they are immediately sanctioned.
At the same time, the cost of sanctioning is shared by many punishers, which conveys
them a local evolutionary advantage. However, at the front where many defectors meet
with punishers the cost of sanctioning become prohibitive, and ultimately defectors
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Figure 3. Spatial pattern formation reveals evolutionary advantages of probabilistic
sanctioning. In the absence of punishers [panels (a) to (d)] cooperators alone struggle
to uphold compact cooperative clusters. If everybody punishes the costs of sanctioning
are prohibitive to success and defectors win [panels (i) to (l)]. If the responsibility to
sanction is shared 50:50 randomly, cooperative clusters remain compact and smooth,
and at the same time their ﬁtness is superior to that of defectors [panels (e) to (h)].
The direction of invasion therefore reverses and cooperators win. Cooperators who
are willing to punish defectors in at least three out of the ﬁve groups are depicted
green, while other cooperators are depicted blue. Defectors are depicted by red. Pie
diagrams on the right show the corresponding ratio of elementary invasions between
different strategy pairs, conﬁrming that probabilistic sanctioning tips the balance in
favour of cooperation. We have used a different shade of red to distinguish between
D → C and D → P invasions. In all three cases the evolution starts from a random
initial state using r = 4 and α = 2. The system size is 100× 100.
easily prevail [see panel (l)]. If the application of sanctioning is probabilistic (p = 0.5),
the direction of invasion is reversed. As illustrated in panels (e) to (h), defectors are
eventually completely eliminated from the population. This is because probabilistic
sanctioning preserves the smoothness of cooperative interfaces, while at the same time
the mixture of pure cooperators and punishers can prevail in the direct competition
against defectors. Paradoxically, the option to resort to second-order free-riding provides
the necessary relief from the punishment costs, which in turn maintains a healthy fitness
of the cooperative domains. The key to success is that the costs of sanctioning are shared.
We have also monitored the elementary invasion processes between the competing
domains of strategies. The results of which are summarized as pie diagrams that depict
the ratios of diﬀerent invasion steps at corresponding values of p at the right of Fig 3.
The pie diagrams confirm that the frequency of defector invasions for p = 0 and p = 1
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Figure 4. Sharing a costly altruistic act like punishment may render it evolutionary
viable regardless of the particularities that determine the method of sharing.
Probabilistic sharing [panels (a) to (d)] as well as periodic sharing [panels (i) to
(l)] of sanctioning reverse the direction of invasion and lead to complete dominance
of cooperators. If strategies are permanent and can change only via imitation, the
spontaneous segregation of pure cooperators and punishers will reveal the superiority
of defectors against both weaker strategies [panels (e) to (h)]. In all three cases the
evolution starts from an identical prepared initial state using p = 0.5, r = 3.6 and
α = 1. The system size is 100× 100.
is higher than the frequency of cooperator invasions, which ultimately results in states
where defection is widespread [see panels (d) and (l)]. For p = 0.5, on the other hand,
the combined frequency of C → D and P → D invasions is higher than the combined
reverse, and as a result collectively the cooperators rise to complete dominance. A
careful comparison reveals further that the majority of invasion steps that reduce the
number of defectors is due to cooperators that do not punish. In other words, second-
order free-riders become stronger against defectors due to the probabilistic presence of
punishers. The pie diagrams also highlight that C can beat D only in the presence of
P , thus indicating that a multi-point interaction is necessary to observe the reported
counterintuitive phenomenon.
Our observations on structured populations can be summarized as “two weaker
strategies are able to form a stronger one”. This is reminiscent of Parrondo’s paradox
[34, 35], where two losing games, if combined, can become a winning game. To determine
exactly what mixture is necessary between second-order free-riders and punishers, we
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compare the evolutionary outcomes of three diﬀerent variations of the studied public
goods game. For clarity, we have use a prepared initial state as depicted in the leftmost
panels of Fig. 4, although the occupance of cooperators and defectors is still equally
split. The initial use of homogeneous strategy domains simply helps to reveal the
leading mechanism that is responsible for the emergence of spatial patterns. Panels
(a) to (d) depict the outcome of the traditional model where cooperators can turn to
punishers (and vice versa) probabilistically with probability p = 0.5. In agreement with
the results presented in Fig. 3, albeit at diﬀerent parameter values, we can observe
complete dominance of cooperative behaviour [see panel (d)]. Panels (e) to (h), on
the other hand, depict a very diﬀerent outcome that emerges if pure cooperators
and punishers are not allowed to randomly switch roles. Strategy exchange is of
course possible between all three competing strategies, but this is the only way a pure
cooperator can turn into a punisher or vice versa. The evolution of the cooperative
stripe illustrates convincingly that a simple mixture of C and P players is unable to beat
defectors. Indeed, pure cooperators (blue) can invade defectors only in the close vicinity
of punishers. Accordingly, pure cooperators are able to launch a short-lived invasion
into the territory of defectors, as shown in panel (f). But as soon as pure cooperators
become isolated from the punishers due to the successful invasion, they themselves
become vulnerable again. The game is then eﬀectively reset to the p = 0 case, which
yields complete dominance of defectors at such a low value of the enhancement factor.
An additional negative consequence of spatiality is that pure cooperators and punishers
will become separated via neutral drift even if they were mixed at the beginning [see
panels (f) and (g)], and this too favours defectors because head to head they are superior
to both isolated strategies. Overall, it is easy to see that neither type of mixture of
permanent strategies can help to overcome the problem of costly punishment.
Although the failure of a particular mixture of permanent strategies might suggest
that only the probabilistic combination of two “weaker” strategies can produce a
“winning” strategy — in analogy with the Parrondo’s paradox [34, 35] — panels (i)
to (l) are quick to convince us of the contrary. Here pure cooperators and punishers
are exchanged not randomly but periodically after every round, and as can be observed
in panel (l), this option too leads to complete dominance of cooperative behaviour.
The Parrondo’s paradox can also be observed if the two loosing games are exchanged
periodically, thus strengthening the outlined analogy. We note that the success of
periodically shared costs might explain why working in shifts to share and distribute
heavy workload is common in human societies.
In the remainder of this section, we turn to the explanation of the other
counterintuitive phenomenon, which is the non-monotonous dependence of the
cooperation level on α. Since the eﬀect exists even at p = 1, as illustrated in Fig. 2,
we focus on the simplest case when only D and P players are initially present in the
population. We know that if α is small, defectors are fined mildly and that thus this has a
rather negligible negative impact on their payoﬀs. The same holds true for punishers that
have to bear small corresponding costs. Punishment in this case is thus a second-order
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Figure 5. Schematic presentation of the interface that separates punishers and
defectors. The two leading elementary processes that contribute the most to the
velocity of the interface are marked by arrows. This setup is used for the stability
analysis of competing domains at p = 1, where only defectors and punishers are present.
The analysis reveals the “smaller is better” effect in costly punishment, and it explains
the non-monotonous dependence of the cooperation level on the ﬁne α.
eﬀect, in particular coming second to network reciprocity. As α increases, however, the
emerging spatial patterns receive further support from the fines imposed on defectors,
and gradually they spread across the whole population. The question to be answered
then is why the application of high α values starts to have a negative impact on the
evolution of cooperation? On the one hand, higher α imply higher costs to punishers, but
at the same time, defectors are fined more severely as well. The key to understanding is
again rooted in the spatial patterns. More precisely, we have to clarify how the domain
interfaces that separate the two competing strategies move. Since the interfaces that
separate clusters of the two competing strategies become smooth due to the reduced
payoﬀ values on both sides, we focus on a typical interface as illustrated in Fig. 5, and
we analyse its stability in dependence on the punishment fine α.
The elementary changes that modify the interface in Fig. 5 are the invasions across
the line that separates unequal strategies. The leading invasions thereby are those which
are marked with arrows. Evidently, other elementary processes are also possible, but to
consider them all would make the following analysis untraceable. More importantly, the
likelihood of the other elementary processes (those not marked with an arrow) is much
smaller, and hence their contribution to the boundary velocity is negligible. Based on
this, the average payoﬀ diﬀerence between the two strategies can be estimated as
ΠP − ΠD =
3
2
r − 5−
5
24
α , (1)
from where the critical value of the punishment fine equals
αc =
24
5
(
3
2
r − 5
)
. (2)
At αc the direction of invasion between strategies P and D reverses, and it can be
deduced that it is indeed better to punish mildly. In particular, if α > αc then ΠP < ΠD,
which implies an eventual dominance of defectors. Conversely, if α < αc then ΠP > ΠD
and punishers win. These eﬀects give rise to the non-monotonous dependence of the
cooperation level on α, and they corroborate previous theoretical and experimental work
on costly punishment where a similar “smaller is better” eﬀect has been reported before
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[36, 37]. We conclude by emphasizing that this outcome remains valid also on other
interaction networks, and that it is indeed the sole consequence of the population being
structured rather than well-mixed — a key point that should not be overlooked in future
human experiments.
3. Discussion
To summarize, we have shown that sharing a costly altruistic act like prosocial
punishment can be a game changer. Sharing, either probabilistic or periodic, can
render the costly act evolutionary viable, even though in the absence of sharing the
act is obviously unable to grab a hold in the population. We have focused on costly
punishment as particular and frequently studied example of such an act [9], and we have
demonstrated that the consideration of probabilistic sanctioning solves the problem of
costly punishment. The question is no longer whether punishers can survive alongside
cooperators that refuse to punish, but rather is a mixture of pure cooperators and
punishers able to outperform defectors? An intuitive answer to this question would
be no, since neither cooperators nor punishers alone have an obvious evolutionary
advantage over defectors. Yet our study reveals the opposite. Two loosing strategies
are able to form a winning strategy if only they share the costs of the altruistic act
— in our case the costs of sanctioning. This counterintuitive evolutionary outcome is
reminiscent of the Parrondo’s paradox [34, 35], where two losing games, if combined
either probabilistically or periodically, can become a winning game.
While in well-mixed populations probabilistic sanctioning simply transforms the
public goods game into a coordination game, in structured populations the evolutionary
outcomes are significantly more interesting and versatile. The key to understanding
the various solutions lies in spatial pattern formation, and in particular in multi-point
interactions that enable the counterintuitive solutions. As we have pointed out, even
if pure cooperators alone or punishers alone are weaker than defectors, their stochastic
or periodic combination can revert the direction of invasion in favour of cooperative
behaviour. This is made possible by the fact that the presence of punishers strengthens
cooperators that do not punish. The opposite is true as well, but it works only if
punishers are occasionally freed from their duty to sanction defectors. During this time,
however, it is crucial that other cooperators within the group take on the responsibility
and bear the additional costs. Multi-point interactions are a key ingredient for this
work, and the public goods game in particular, since being played in groups, is a
paradigmatic example of a game that enables just that. As soon as the option to
abstain from punishing is no longer given, the mechanism fails and the evolutionary
process terminates either in full defection or in a state of modest cooperation that is
sustained solely due to network reciprocity.
Probabilistic exploration of strategies, especially when turning to imitation
dynamics, social learning or cultural evolution, appears to play an important role [29].
Recent experiments indicate that human punishment may be motivated by inequity
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aversion rather than by the desire for reciprocity [38], and evidence is mounting that
emotions play a decisive role as well [28, 18]. Sanctions may also be motivated by selfish
or greedy intentions and spite, and if they are, sanctioning can have dire consequences
for altruistic cooperation and the evolutionary advantages are questionable [39, 40, 41].
These considerations support the notion of probabilistic sanctioning, and indeed it
seems unreasonable to expect of individuals to execute punishment either rationally or
permanently. The presented results indicate that this alone may be reason enough for
punishment to become widespread in human societies. Moreover, given the nature of the
stick versus carrot dilemma [42], we expect the same conclusions to hold if punishment
would be replaced by reward.
4. Appendix: Methods
4.1. Replicator equation
The evolutionary dynamics of the studied public goods game in well-mixed populations
is determined by the replication equation of the fraction of all the cooperators f in the
population (regardless of whether they punish or not) [43]
df
dt
= f(1− f)[ΠX − ΠD], (3)
where ΠX = pΠP + (1 − p)ΠC is the average payoﬀ of all the cooperators while ΠP ,
ΠC and ΠD are the average payoﬀs of punishing cooperators, second-order free-riders
(cooperators that do not punish) and defectors, respectively.
To study the evolutionary dynamics of f in an infinite well-mixed population, we
assume that in each round of the game an interaction group is assembled by randomly
selecting n individuals from the population. The average payoﬀs ΠP , ΠC and ΠD are
then
ΠP =
n∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i × (4)
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
pj(1− p)i−j
[
r(i+ 1)
n
− 1−
α(n− 1− i)
j + 1
]
,
ΠC =
n∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i × (5)
i∑
j=0
(
i
j
)
pj(1− p)i−j
[
r(i+ 1)
n
− 1
]
and
ΠD =
n∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i
i∑
j=1
(
i
j
)
pj(1− p)i−j
(
ri
n
− α
)
(6)
+
n∑
i=0
(
n− 1
i
)
f i(1− f)n−1−i(1− p)i
ri
n
,
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respectively. The sought payoﬀ diﬀerence is
ΠX − ΠD =
(
−1 +
r
n
)
+ α[1− (1− pf)n−1]
(
1−
1− f
f
)
, (7)
and the replicator equation can be rewritten as
df
dt
= (1− f)
{(
−1 +
r
n
)
f + α[1− (1− pf)n−1](2f − 1)
}
. (8)
The stability analysis of Eq. 8 reveals that the evolutionary dynamics has two
boundary equilibria f = 0 and f = 1, and interior equilibria that are determined by
the roots of the function g(f) = ΠX − ΠD. It follows that for 0 < f ≤ 0.5 the second
term of g(f) is negative. Hence, when r < n, the function g(f) < 0 for all f ∈ (0, 0.5).
On the other hand, for 0.5 < f < 1, the function g(f) is strictly increasing since
its first order derivative is always positive. We thus find that there are no interior
equilibria in f ∈ (0, 0.5], and that there is at most one equilibrium in f ∈ (0.5, 1).
Furthermore, the stability of the interior equilibria in f ∈ (0.5, 1) is determined by
g(1) = −1+ r/n+α[1− (1− p)n−1], from which we have the following two conclusions:
(i) When −1 + r/n+ α[1− (1− p)n−1] ≤ 0 (i.e., p ≤ 1− (1−
1−
r
n
α
)
1
n−1 ), the replicator
equation has no interior equilibria in f ∈ (0, 1). Only f = 0 is a stable equilibrium,
while f = 1 is an unstable equilibrium.
(ii) When −1 + r/n + α[1− (1− p)n−1] > 0 (i.e., p > 1− (1−
1−
r
n
α
)
1
n−1 ), there is only
one interior equilibrium f ∗ in (0.5, 1), but it is unstable since g′(f ∗) > 0. The two
boundary equilibria f = 0 and f = 1, on the other hand, are both stable.
4.2. Monte Carlo simulations
The public goods game is staged on a square lattice with periodic boundary conditions
where L2 players are arranged into overlapping groups of size n = 5 such that everyone
is connected to its four nearest neighbours. Accordingly, each individual belongs to five
diﬀerent groups. We note that the square lattice is the simplest of networks that allows
us to go beyond the well-mixed population assumption, and as such it allows us to take
into account the fact that the interactions among humans are inherently structured
rather than random. By using the square lattice, we also continue a long-standing
history that begun with the work of Nowak and May [33], who were the first to show
that the most striking diﬀerences in the outcome of an evolutionary game emerge when
the assumption of a well-mixed population is abandoned for the usage of a structured
population. Many have since followed the same practice [44, 45, 36] (for a review see
[46]), and there exist ample evidence in support of the claim that, especially for games
that are governed by group interactions [47, 48], using the square lattice suﬃces to reveal
all the relevant evolutionary outcomes, and also that these are qualitatively independent
of the interaction structure.
Initially each player on site x is designated either as a cooperator (sx = C) or
defector (sx = D) with equal probability. Monte Carlo simulations of the game are
carried out comprising the following elementary steps. A randomly selected player
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x plays the public goods game with its four partners as a member of all the five
groups, whereby its overall payoﬀ Πsx is thus the sum of all the payoﬀs acquired in
each individual group, as described in the Introduction. Next, player x chooses one of
its nearest neighbours at random, and the chosen co-player y also acquires its payoﬀ Πsy
in the same way. Finally, player x imitates the strategy of player y with a probability
given by the Fermi function Γ = 1/{1+ exp[(Πsx −Πsy)/K]}, where K = 0.5 quantifies
the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [49], implying that better performing players
are readily adopted, although it is not impossible to adopt the strategy of a player
performing worse. Such errors in decision making can be attributed to mistakes and
external influences that adversely aﬀect the evaluation of the opponent.
In agreement with the random sequential updating, each Monte Carlo step gives a
chance for every player to imitate the strategy from one of its neighbours once on average.
As the key quantity, we determine the fraction of all the cooperators f (regardless of
whether they punish or not) in the stationary state, which is considered to be reached
when f becomes time-independent. Depending on the actual conditions (proximity to
phase transition points and the typical size of emerging spatial patterns), the linear
system size was varied from L = 100 to 400 and the relaxation time was varied from
104 to 105 MCS to ensure proper statistical accuracy.
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